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STRICT LIABILITY: A COMMENT
RICHARD A. POSNER*

WITHIN the last year there have appeared several major articles' that,
while otherwise extremely diverse, share a strong preference (in one case
implicit) for using the principle of "strict liability" to resolve legal conflicts over resource use.2 I shall argue in this comment that the authors of
these articles fail to make a convincing case for strict liability, primarily
because they do not analyze the economic consequences of the principle correctly.
To explicate these consequences I shall use the now familiar example of
the railroad engine that emits sparks which damage crops along the railroad's
right of way. I shall assume that the costs of transactions between the railroad and the farmers are so high that the liability imposed by the law will not
be shifted by negotiations between the parties.
The economic goal of liability rules in such a case is to maximize the joint
value of the interfering activities, railroading and farming. 3 To identify the
value-maximizing solution requires a comparison of the costs to the railroad
of taking steps to reduce spark emissions to various levels, including zero, and
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago. Harold Demsetz and Hein D. Kitz commented helpfully on an earlier draft. This paper is part of a study of liability rules being
conducted under a grant from the National Science Foundation to the National Bureau of
Economic Research for research in law and economics. The paper is not an official National
Bureau publication since it has not undergone the full critical review accorded National
Bureau studies, including approval by the Bureau's board of directors.
I William F. Baxter & Lillian R. Altree, Legal Aspects of Airport Noise, 15 J. Law &
Econ. 1 (1972); Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability
in Torts, 81 Yale L.J. 1055 (1972); George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort
Theory, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1972); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability,
2 J. Leg. Studies 151 (1973). My analysis is also an implicit criticism of Marc A. Franklin,
Tort Liability for Hepatitis: An Analysis and Appraisal, 24 Stan. L. Rev. 439 (1972),
especially id. at 462-64, and of much judicial writing on the subject; see, e.g., Escola v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring).
2 The concept of strict liability is a various one, but at its core is the notion that one
who injures another should be held liable whether or not the injurer was negligent or
otherwise at fault.
a Or, stated otherwise, to maximize the joint value of the railroad's right of way and
the farmer's land.
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the costs to farmers of either tolerating or themselves taking steps to reduce
the damage to their property from the sparks. The value-maximizing solution
may turn out to involve changes by both parties in their present behavior;
for example, the railroad may have to install a good but not perfect spark
arrester and the farmer may have to leave an unplanted buffer space between
the railroad right of way and his tilled fields. Or, the value-maximizing solution may involve changes by the railroad only, by the farmer only, or by
neither party.
Let us consider what, if any, different effects negligence and strict liability
-- competing approaches to the design of liability rules-might have in nudging railroad and farmer toward the value-maximizing (efficient) solution,
under various assumptions as to what that solution is.
The railroad will be adjudged negligent if the crop damage exceeds the
cost to the railroad of avoiding that damage. 4 But the farmer will still not
prevail if the cost of the measures he might have taken to avoid the damage
to his crops is less than the crop damage; this is the rule of contributory
negligence.
If the efficient solution requires only that the railroad take some measure
to reduce the farmer's crop damage, then the negligence approach leads us
toward the efficient solution. Since the railroad is liable for the damage and
the damage is greater than the cost to the railroad of preventing it,5 the railroad
will adopt the preventive measure in order to avoid a larger damage judgment.
If the efficient solution is either that the railroad do nothing or that both
parties do nothing, the negligence standard will again lead to the efficient
solution. Not being liable, the railroad will have no incentive to adopt preventive measures; the farmer will have no incentive to take precautions either,
since by hypothesis the cost of doing so would exceed the crop damage that
he suffers. If the efficient solution requires only the farmer to take precautions, the negligence approach again points in the right direction. The railroad is not liable and does not take precautions. The farmer takes precautions,
as we want him to do, because they cost less than the crop damage they
prevent.
That leaves only the case where the efficient solution involves avoidance
by both parties. Again the negligence standard should lead toward an efficient
solution. The farmer will adopt his cost-justified avoidance measure so as
4 The meaning of negligence is explored in Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence,
I J. Leg. Studies 29 (1972). The example in text assumes that the probability of the
damage occurring is one; the assumption is not essential to the analysis. It also assumes
that the only possibilities are no crops or no sparks; this assumption, which is again not
essential to the analysis, will be relaxed.
5 If the cost of prevention exceeded the damage cost, prevention would not be the
-efficient solution. The efficient solution would be to permit the damage to take place.
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not to be barred by the contributory negligence rule and once he has done
so the railroad will adopt its cost-justified avoidance measure to avoid liability for the accidents that the farmer's measure does not prevent.
The foregoing discussion must be qualified in one important respect. If
the efficient solution requires only the railroad to take precautions but the
farmer could take a precaution that, although more costly than the railroad's
(otherwise it would be the optimum solution), would be less costly than the
crop damage, the farmer's failure to adopt the measure will, nonetheless, be
deemed contributory negligence. He will therefore adopt it and the railroad
will have no incentive to adopt what is in fact the cheaper method of damage
prevention.
A principle of strict liability, with no defense of contributory negligence,
would produce an efficient solution where that solution was either for the
railroad alone to take precautions or for neither party to do so,6 but not in
the other two cases. In the case where the efficient solution is for the farmer
alone to take avoidance measures, strict liability would not encourage efficiency, for with the railroad liable for all crop damage the farmer would
have no incentive to avoid such damage even if it was cheaper for him to do
so; he would be indifferent between the crops and compensation for their
destruction. Similarly, in the case where the efficient solution consists of precautions by both railroad and farmer, strict liability would give the farmer
no incentive to shoulder his share of the responsibility. Butwe need only add
a defense of contributory negligence in strict liability cases in order to give
the farmer an incentive to take precautions where appropriate. There would
still be the problem of inefficient solutions where the farmer's precaution,
although less costly than his crop damage, was more costly than the railroad's
precaution; but this could be remedied by redefining the contributory negligence defense-a step that should be taken in any event.
At least as a first approximation, then, a strict liability standard with a
defense of contributory negligence is as efficient as the conventional negligence standard, but not more efficient. This conclusion would appear to hold
with even greater force where, as in a products liability case, there is (or
can readily be created) a seller-buyer relationship between injurer and victim. Indeed, it can be shown that in that situation an efficient solution is
likely to be reached not only under either strict liability (plus contributory
negligence) or negligence, but equally with no tort liability at all.
The cost of a possibly dangerous product to the consumer has two elements:
the price of the product and an expected accident cost (for a risk-neutral
6

In the first case, the railroad would be liable and would have an incentive to adopt
the precaution. In the second case, the railroad would still be liable but it would have
no incentive to adopt precautions; it would prefer to pay a judgment cost that by

hypothesis would be lower than the cost of the precautions.
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purchaser, the cost of an accident if it occurs multiplied by the probability
of occurrence). Regardless of liability, the seller will have an incentive to
adopt any cost-justified precaution, because, by lowering the total cost of
7
the product to the buyer, it will enable the seller to increase his profit.
Where, however, the buyer can prevent the accident at lower cost than the
seller, the buyer can be counted on to take the precaution rather than the seller,
for by doing so the buyer will minimize the sum of the price of the product
(which will include the cost of any precautions taken by the seller) and the
expected accident cost.8
Although both strict liability and negligence appear to provide efficient
solutions to problems of conflicting resource uses, they do not have identical
economic effects. The difference comes in cases where the efficient solution
is for neither party to the interference to do anything. This is the category
of interferences known in negligence law as "unavoidable accidents." They
are rarely unavoidable in the literal sense. But frequently the cost either to
injurer or to victim of taking measures to prevent an accident exceeds the
expected accident cost and in such a case efficiency requires that the accident
be permitted to occur. Under a negligence standard, the injurer is not liable;
under strict liability, he is. What if any economic difference does this make?
It can be argued that unless an industry is liable for its unavoidable accidents, consumers may be led to substitute the product of the industry for
the safer product of another industry. Suppose the only difference between
railroads and canals as methods of transportation were that railroads had
more unavoidable accidents. If the railroad industry were not liable for those
accidents, the price of railroad transportation would be the same as the price
of transportation by canal, yet we would want people to use canals rather
than railroads because the former were superior in the one respect-safety-in which the two methods differed. In principle, a negligence standard would
require the railroad to bear the cost of those accidents. They are not unavoidable. In fact, they could be avoided at zero cost by the substitution of canal
for railroad transportation. But perhaps courts are incapable of making inter7 Suppose the price of a product is $10 and the expected accident cost 10o; then the
total cost to the (risk-neutral) consumer is $10.10. If the producer can reduce the expected accident cost to 5C-say at a cost of 3¢ to himself-then he can increase the
price of the product to $10.05, since the cost to the (risk-neutral) consumer remains the
same. Thus his profit per unit is increased by 2¢. (In fact, he will be able to increase his
total profits even more by raising price less.) The extra profit will eventually be bid away

by competition from producers but that is in the nature of competitive advantages.
8 This is actually a more efficient solution than either negligence or strict liability, since

it avoids the problem we noted earlier of the law's economically incorrect definition of
contributory negligence.
The economics of products liability is debated at length in Symposium, Products Liability: Economic Analysis and the Law, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1970). See in particular
Roland N. McKean, Products Liability: Trends and Implications, id. at 3.
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industry comparisons in applying the negligence standard. Nonetheless the
argument affords no basis for preferring strict liability to negligence, since
an identical but opposite distortion is created by strict liability. Compare two
different tracts of land that are identical in every respect except that one is
immediately adjacent to a railroad line and one is well back from any railroad line. If the railroad is strictly liable for crop damage inflicted by engine
sparks there will be no incentive to use the tract near the railroad line for
fire-insensitive uses and to shift the growing of flammable crops to the tract
that is remote from a railroad line, even though such a rearrangement may
eliminate all crop damage at zero cost.
A related misconception involves the question of the comparative safety
level in the long run under strict liability versus negligence liability. The level
of safety is unaffected in the short run by which liability rule is chosen.
Even if the injurer is strictly liable, he will not try to prevent an accident
where the cost of prevention exceeds the accident cost; he will prefer to pay
the victim's smaller damages. However, he will have an incentive to invest in
research and development efforts designed to develop a cost-justified method
of accident prevention, for such a method would lower the cost of complying
with a rule of strict liability. It is tempting to conclude that strict liability
encourages higher, and in the long run more efficient, levels of safety, but
this is incorrect. Rather than creating an incentive to engage in research
on safety, a rule of strict liability merely shifts that incentive. Under the
negligence standard the cost of unavoidable accidents is borne by the victims
of accidents. They can reduce this cost in the long run by financing research
into and development of cost-justified measures by which to protect themselves. The victims will not themselves organize for research, but they will
provide the market for firms specializing in the development of new safety
appliances. 9
Let us consider some other possible differences, in economic effect, between
strict liability and negligence. It might appear that strict liability would
reduce the costs of tort litigation, both by simplifying the issues in a trial
and thereby reducing its costs and by removing an element of uncertainty
and thereby facilitating settlements, which are cheaper than trials. But the
matter is more complex than this. By increasing the scope of liability, strict
liability enlarges the universe of claims, so even if the fraction of cases that
go to trial is smaller the absolute number may be larger. And, by increasing
the certainty that the plaintiff will prevail, strict liability encourages him
to spend more money on the litigation; conceivably, therefore, the costs of
trials might actually increase. 10
9 In principle, the costs of research should be included in the basic negligence calculus;
in practice, we may assume they are not.
10 On the determinants of the choice to litigate rather than to settle and of expenditures
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Under strict liability, in effect the railroad (in our example) insures the
farmer against the loss of his crops; under negligence liability, the farmer
must obtain and pay for insurance himself (or self-insure). Thus, although
strict liability, under the name "enterprise liability," has long been defended
on the ground" that it permits accident losses to be spread more widely, there
is little to this argument: the farmer can avoid a concentrated loss by insuring. However, if we were confident that the cost of insuring was lower for
the railroad than for the farmer, we might on this ground prefer strict
12
liability.
Strict liability increases the costs of railroading, in our example, and negligence the costs of farming. But the implications for the overall distribution
of income and wealth are uncertain, at least in the example, so intertwined
were the economic interests of railroads and farmers during the period when
the modern system of negligence liability was taking shape. Any increase in
the cost of railroading would be borne in significant part by farmers since they
were the railroads' principal customers. The intertwining of economic interests
is characteristic of many modern tort contexts as well, such as automobile and
product accidents. Most victims of automobile accidents are owners of automobiles; victims of defective products are also consumers.
Additional considerations come into play where there is a buyer-seller
relationship between victim and injurer; but they relate primarily to the
question whether sellers' liability (either strict liability or negligence) has
different consequences from no liability (i.e., buyers' liability). There are two
reasons for believing that there might be different safety consequences. First,
if the buyers of a product are risk preferring, they may be unwilling to pay for
a safety improvement even if the cost is less than the expected accident cost
that the improvement would eliminate. Under a rule of no liability, the improvement will not be made; under a rule either of strict liability or of negligence liability, the improvement will be made.' 3 But the higher level of safety
on litigation see Richard A. Posner, The Behavior of Administrative Agencies, 1 J. Leg.
Studies 305-23 (1972); see also William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts,
14 J. Law & Econ. 61 (1971).
" Not an economic ground. See Richard A. Posner, Book Review, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev.
643 (1970).

12 The farmer may not want to insure; he may be a risk preferrer. A risk preferrer is
someone who likes to take chances. He will pay $1 for a lottery ticket although the prize
is $1000 and his chances of winning only one in 2000. And he may prefer to accept
a one one-thousandth chance of a $1000 loss rather than pay $1 to insure against the
loss. He will be especially hostile to the idea of paying $1.10 for that insurance, a more
realistic example since insurance involves administrative expenses that consume a part
of the premium. Hence, if many farmers are risk preferring and do not want insurance,
the benefits of strict liability, as perceived by them, may be slight.
13 This assumes that the producer cannot disclaim liability; the effect of a disclaimer

is to shift liability to the consumer.
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is not optimum in the economic sense, since it is higher than consumers want.
Second, consumers may lack knowledge of product safety. Criticisms of
market processes based on the consumer's lack of information are often
superficial, because they ignore the fact that competition among sellers generates information about the products sold. There is however a special consideration in the case of safety information: the firm that advertises that its
product is safer than a competitor's may plant fears in the minds of potential
consumers where none existed before. If a product hazard is small, or perhaps great but for some reason not widely known (e.g., cigarettes, for a long
time), consumers may not be aware of it. In these circumstances a seller may
be reluctant to advertise a safety improvement, because the advertisement will
contain an implicit representation that the product is hazardous (otherwise,
the improvement would be without value). He must balance the additional
sales that he may gain from his rivals by convincing consumers that his
product is safer than theirs against the sales that he may lose by disclosing
to consumers that the product contains hazards of which they may not have
been aware, or may have been only dimly aware. If advertising and marketing
a safety improvement are thus discouraged, the incentive to adopt such improvements is reduced. But make the producer liable for the consequences
of a hazardous product, and no question of advertising safety improvements
to consumers will arise. He will adopt cost-justified precautions not to divert
sales from competitors but to minimize liability to injured consumers.
In principle, we need not assume that the only possible sources of information about product safety are the manufacturers of the product. Producers in
other industries would stand to gain from exposing an unsafe product, but if
their products are not close substitutes for the unsafe product, as is implicit
in our designation of them as members of other industries, the gain will be
small and the incentive to invest money in investigating the safety of the
product and disseminating the results of the investigation slight. Firms could of
course try to sell product information directly to consumers; the problem is
that because property rights in information are relatively undeveloped, the
supplier of information is frequently unable to recover his investment in
obtaining and communicating it.
The information problem just discussed provides an arguable basis for
rejecting caveat emptor in hazardous-products cases, but not for replacing
negligence with strict liability in such cases, which is the trend of the
law. The traditional pockets of strict liability, such as respondeat superior
and the liability of blasters and of keepers of vicious animals, can be viewed
as special applications of negligence theory. 14 The question whether a general
substitution of strict for negligence liability would improve efficiency seems
14

See note 23, infra; Richard A. Posner, supra note 4, at 42-44, 76.

HeinOnline -- 2 J. Legal Stud. 211 1973

THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

at this stage hopelessly conjectural; the question is at bottom empirical and
the empirical work has not been done. Finally, it is interesting to note that
in the area of tort law that is in greatest ferment, liability for automobile
accidents, the movement appears to be from negligence to no lability!15
II
A
Now to our authors. I begin with Professor Baxter. His discussion of strict
liability is brief and largely implicit, and in focusing upon one small aspect
of a long and excellent study I hope I will not be understood as intending a
general criticism of his article.
Baxter is concerned with the problem of airport noise. The airlines correspond to the railroad in our example. The owners of residences in the vicinity
of the airport who are disturbed or annoyed by airplane noise correspond to
the farmer. Baxter seeks a rule of liability that will lead to an efficient level
of noise damage. One approach that he considers is the noise easement. Under
existing law an airline that flies low enough to create a high noise level is
required to obtain from the owner of the subjacent property (by condemnation, if the airline cannot come to terms with him) an easement for the
airline to maintain that noise level. The price of the easement in a condemnation proceeding will be equal to the reduction in the market value of the
property caused by the noise.
Baxter is troubled by the fact that the easement is perpetual. He points out
that should an airplane noise-suppression device one day be developed that
enabled a reduction in the noise level at a cost lower than the increase in
property values brought about by the device, the airline would have no incentive to install the device 16 and the result would be to perpetuate a solution
to the conflicting uses that was no longer optimum. To remedy this he proposes that easements be limited to ten years. If at the end of that period a
method for reducing noise at a cost lower than the increase in property value
had been developed the airline would install it in order to minimize the cost
17
of acquiring easements for the next period.
This solution solves the problem identified by Professor Baxter but in so
doing unsolves another, and for all one knows as serious, a problem that per15 Most no-fault auto compensation plans involve (1) compulsory accident insurance
and (2) exemption from tort liability.
16 Since it had already paid for the right to maintain the noise level that the device,
not without cost to the airline, would enable it to reduce. It might attempt to sell back
a portion of the easement to the property owners, but each owner would have an incentive to decline to enter into the transaction in the hope that others would do so; for once
the airline purchased the device all the subjacent property owners, those who had not
paid the airline along with those who had, would benefit from the reduced level of noise.
17 See William F. Baxter & Lillian R. Altree, supra note 1, at 17-21, 92-113.
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petual easements avoid. Just as one method of maximizing the joint value of
railroading and farming may be for the farmer to take certain precautions,
so one method of maximizing the joint value of air travel and of land use
may be for the landowners in the vicinity of airports to reduce the damage
from noise by soundproofing or by shifting to a land use that is relatively
insensitive to noise. Assume that sometime after the airline obtains perpetual
easements, an improved method of soundproofing residences is developed;
its adoption would reduce noise damage by more than it costs. Under existing
law the homeowners would have an adequate incentive to adopt the method,
because the entire resulting increase in the value of their homes would inure
to them. Under Baxter's proposed system of time-limited easements the homeowners' incentive to install such devices would be much smaller. A part of the
improvement would inure to the benefit not of the homeowner but of the airline, in the form of a reduced easement price in the next period. The method
of time-limited easements, therefore, will discourage efficient cost-reduction
measures by noise victims.
To demonstrate the fundamental difficulty with Baxter's proposal, let us
imagine that the periods are made shorter and shorter (a process Baxter
would object to, I take it, only on the basis of administrative costs, which
let us assume are zero). In the limit, the system of time-limited easements
becomes a system of strict liability: the airline pays for noise damage as it
occurs. But we saw earlier that a rule of strict liability, unless modified by
a defense of contributory negligence, will not produce an efficient solution
(assuming, as Baxter does, heavy transaction costs) if the solution requires a
change in the victims' behavior.' 8
B
Professor Calabresi proposes that liability be placed on the party to an
interaction who is in the better position to "make the cost-benefit analysis
between accident costs and accident avoidance costs and to act on that decision once it is made."' 19 The application of this rule would lead in many, although not in all, cases to strict liability without any defense of contributory
negligence. For example, suppose that people are frequently injured because
the blade of their rotary mower strikes a stone and that these accidents could
be prevented at least cost by the operator of the mower, who need only remove
the stones in his path. Calabresi suggests that the manufacturer of the mower
might nonetheless be liable under his approach. The injury is an expectable
18 It is noteworthy that in an earlier article, Professor Baxter recognized the importance
of a defense of contributory negligence to strict liability. See William F. Baxter, The
SST: From Watts to Harlem in Two Hours, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 53 (1968).
19 Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, supra note 1, at 1060.
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one and the manufacturer is in a better position than the user to figure out
how to minimize the relevant costs.
To impose liability on the manufacturer in this case, however, is inefficient:
it eliminates the incentive of the operator to adopt a more economical method
of preventing the injury. One could argue, perhaps, that the incentive created
by fear of physical injury is already so great that adding or subtracting a
pecuniary cost will not affect behavior. But Calabresi does not take this
position.
He allows himself an escape hatch. The mower case might be one where,
in his terminology, although the producer is in the better position to determine
the efficient solution he is not in the better position to implement it, since
implementation requires a change in behavior by the user. But this circumstance, while relevant, is not, for Calabresi, decisive: where the party in the
better position to determine the efficient solution is not the one in the better
position to implement it, "the decision requires weighing comparative advantages. 2 o
I am mystified by his approach. The only reason that Calabresi offers for
not placing liability in every case on the party whose behavior we want to
influence in order to produce the efficient solution is that identification of
that party is often very difficult; but his approach requires such identification
in every case, since it is always relevant, although never decisive, to inquire
whether the party best able to judge the costs and benefits of alternative
courses of action is also the party whom we want to act upon that judgment.
I can only speculate on the reasons that have led Calabresi into such an
odd corner. He is, of course, strongly committed to the proposition that the
negligence system is incapable of producing efficient solutions to problems of
conflicting resource use.21 And he must now believe, perhaps for reasons
similar to those presented in part I of this comment, that strict liability is
not sharply distinguishable from negligence so far as the production of efficient
solutions to problems of conflicting resource use is concerned. He has therefore
shifted discussion to a new level, where the inability of either principle to
optimize accident costs is admitted and strict liability defended on another
ground altogether: that it is the appropriate method of compelling the party
better able to determine the efficient solution to make that determination.
Where, however, that party is incapable of acting on the determinationbecause the solution turns out to require a change in behavior by the other
party and transaction costs preclude him from paying that party to make the
change-it is very difficult to see what has been accomplished. That is pre201d.

at 1060, n.19.

21

See Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents, A Legal and Economic Analysis, pt. IV
(1970) ; Guido Calabresi &Jon T. Hirschoff, supra note 1, at 1075 and n.74.
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sumably why Calabresi added a second prong to his test, requiring that the
party best able to make the cost-benefit analysis also be able to act upon it.
But to use the second prong the court (or legislature) must make precisely
the determination about which Calabresi is so skeptical when it is made in a
negligence case: the determination of which party is in the better position to
optimize the costly interaction.
C
Let us turn now to the moralists, Professors Fletcher and Epstein. Fletcher
discusses two competing paradigms, or theories, of tort liability. One is the
entirely novel "paradigm of reciprocity," under which the injurer is strictly
liable if he created a risk to the victim that was disproportionate to the risk
the victim created to him. He sets out "to demonstrate the pervasive reliance
of the common law on the paradigm of reciprocity, '2 2 but many of the
examples he uses in the demonstration are odd. 23 His reasons for promoting
the paradigm of reciprocity emerge from his criticism of the competing
theory, which he terms the "paradigm of reasonableness" and which corresponds roughly to the negligence standard interpreted in economic terms.
Fletcher dislikes this paradigm because it is instrumentalist: that is, it involves a comparison of the utility of the victim's conduct with the utility of
the injurer's. In cases where the negligence principle results in the denial of
compensation to someone injured by one of Fletcher's nonreciprocal (disproportionate) risks, an innocent victim is sacrificed on the altar of community needs.2 4 He believes that the refusal to compensate in these circumstances is the moral equivalent of punishing for bigamy a woman who
honestly believed that her first husband was dead.
The relationship of the paradigm of reciprocity to strict liability is not one
to one. But railroads vis-A-vis farmers, drivers vis-a-vis pedestrians, and many
other interactions traditionally governed by the negligence principle would
become, under his approach, areas of strict liability. Fletcher's analysis, however, is unsound. Reciprocity in his sense is a function purely of the rule of
liability that happens to be adopted, and not of any underlying physical or
22 George P. Fletcher, supra note 1, at 543.
23 For example, assault and battery. How would Professor Fletcher deal with the rule

that permits both parties to an illegal combat to obtain damages from the other if he
is injured (see Clarence Morris, Morris on Torts 30-31 (1953))? It is a rule of strict
liability, but under his view should not be; so far as the reciprocity of the risk (in his
terms) is concerned, an illegal combat is just like a mid-air collision. Another of his odd
examples is the strict liability of owners of vicious dogs. The common law rule (see id. at
239) is that the dog's owner must have reason to believe that the dog is vicious (the
"one-bite" rule), and so understood represents an application of the negligence principle
rather than of strict liability.
24 See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, supra note 1, at 564.
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economic relationships. Were the railroad strictly liable for crop damage
caused by engine sparks it could not injure the farmer; he would be indifferent
as between having crops and being fully compensated for their destruction.
But he could injure the railroad-by planting additional crops (perhaps closer
to the railroad right of way), by planting more flammable or more valuable
crops, by stacking hay ricks near the tracks, by erecting wooden buildings near
the tracks, and so on. Any of these actions would increase the railroad's
damage bill and might ultimately force the railroad to discontinue its line, with
resulting losses to the railroad's shareholders, employees, and customers
(perhaps most of whom are farmers). One can make the element of victimization even clearer by assuming that the railroad line was built before the
adjacent lands were used for farming. This is plausible since the construction
of a railroad line typically increased the agricultural value of land proximate
to it. In such a case are the farmers so morally innocent as to be entitled to
compensation regardless of the costs to the railroad? Would denying them
compensation really be just like imposing a criminal penalty on a woman who
honestly and reasonably believed her husband was dead?
Most torts arise out of a conflict between two morally innocent activities,
such as railroad transportation and farming. What ethical principle compels
society to put a crimp in the former because of the proximity of the latter,
rather than a crimp in the latter because of the proximity of the former?
The farmer crowds the railroad, and the railroad the farmer. A rule of strict
liability taxes the railroad for the benefit of the farmer; a rule of no liability
would tax the farmer for the benefit of the railroad. Under a rule of strict
liability, the railroad pays for the crop damage even if the cheapest way of
minimizing that damage is for the farmer to modify his behavior; the result
is a reduction in the value of the railroad that is greater than the farmer's
gain. Under a rule of no liability the farmer pays for all crop damage even
when the cheapest way of minimizing the damage is for the railroad to modify
its behavior; the result is a reduction in the value of farmland greater than the
railroad's gain. Why is not the railroad morally innocent when it must pay for
damage that the farmer could have avoided at lower cost and the farmer
morally innocent when he is forced to absorb damage costs that the railroad
could have avoided at lower cost?
The situation is not clarified by restating the issue in terms of individual
interests versus community needs. 25 The rule of strict liability, imposed in the
case where the farmer is the cheaper cost avoider, harms both individual
interests-those of the customers (many of them farmers), employees, suppliers, and shareholders of the railroad-and the community interest in efficiency. It benefits other individuals-farmers, consumers of food products
(except their gains may be offset by higher railroad costs), etc.
25

See id. at 573.
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Fletcher would in effect apply a rule of strict liability, without a defense of
contributory negligence, 26 to a number of areas now governed by the negligence standard. Such an approach, as explained in part I of this comment, is
inefficient. Apparently he considers this irrelevant.27 Yet it cannot be an
ethical imperative that society dissipate an indefinite amount of its members'
resources in order to operate a scheme for the compensation of accident
victims, who, after all, can insure against the consequences of an accident.
Fletcher seems at least troubled by the point. He says, for example, that he
desires only to tax and not to prohibit socially useful activity. But this is not
responsive to the problem. A tax, if high enough, becomes prohibitory. Even a
moderate tax will have some resource effects. A compensation system that
fails to give farmers an incentive to economize on their activities will result in
the waste of valuable resources. In another place he states: "If imposing a
private duty of compensation for injuries resulting from nonreciprocal risktaking has an undesirable economic impact on the defendant, the just solution
would not be to deny compensation, but either to subsidize the defendant or
institute a public compensation scheme."128 But this is not responsive to the
problem either. Subsidizing the railroad, in our example, will not give the
farmer an incentive to take cost-justified methods of damage avoidance, and it
is the failure to create such incentives that is the source of inefficiency under
Fletcher's approach.
D
Professor Epstein adopts still a different approach. His position is that a
person should be prima facie liable for any injury that he causes, "cause" to be
defined with reference to the structure of ordinary language rather than in the
strained ways in which it has frequently been used by judges and legal commentators. This view naturally leads him to prefer strict liability to negligence
as the standard of tort liability, although by emphasizing that people should
only be prima facie liable for the injuries they cause he leaves open the possibility of various defenses.
It might appear that Epstein has committed the same error as Fletcher,
that of failing to understand the reciprocal nature of an accident or other
tort injury. He reinforces the impression of error by quoting and then criticizing the passage from Professor Coase's article on social cost in which Coase,
26 See id. at 549, n.44. The article is not entirely clear on this point. Fletcher points
out that sometimes contributory negligence results in the imposition of excessive risks on
the defendant (see id. at 549), and therefore creates a situation of reciprocity in his sense
of that term. Where, as in many cases, the plaintiff's contributory negligence does not
create any risk to the defendant's safety or property, presumably it would not be a defense
under his view (see id. at 549, n.44).
27 See id. at 540-41, 573. His position on this point is not entirely clear due to the obscurity of his discussion of excuses. See, e.g., id. at 553.
28
1d. at 551, n.51.
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in explaining the reciprocal relationship, says that the crop is as much the
cause of the spark damage as the engine.29 But Epstein has not in fact committed this error. He is prepared to concede that from an economic standpoint an inquiry into causation is vacuous; but he insists that in an ordinarylanguage sense it is proper to view the engine as the cause of the crop damage
and improper to view the crop as a cause.
Epstein's achievement is in demonstrating, contrary to the dominant view
of several generations of tort scholars, that a principle of liability based on
causation is not incapable of being reduced to a set of operational rules that
conform to an acceptable notion of cause. But this reader is perplexed why
a society should decide to allocate accident costs in accordance with Epstein's
admittedly plausible notions of causation. What social or ethical end is advanced?
Part of Epstein's answer emerges from his discussion of negligence as an
alternative to strict liability. He makes two major criticisms of negligence. The
first, expressed in various ways, is that we rarely have enough information to
know what the optimum solution to a problem of conflicting resource uses is.
This is true, and it follows that the negligence system produces, at best, crude
approximations of the result one could expect if market rather than legal
processes were operative. But why despise crude approximations? In any
event, Epstein cannot, merely by embracing strict liability, escape the necessity of making such approximations unless he is prepared not to recognize any
defenses that require a comparison of the costs of alternative methods of
resolving the conflict. Whether he is prepared to do so is uncertain; he has
adopted the risky tactic of postponing consideration of the issue to a subsequent article. We shall return to this point.
His second major criticism of the negligence system brings us to the heart
of his reasons for preferring to base liability on causation: it is that the negligence system, if administered in accordance with its basic logic, would give
too much power to judges to impose restrictions on human liberty. He illustrates this point with the "good Samaritan" rule of tort law. If I see another
person in danger and at trivial cost to myself could save him but fail to do so,
I am not liable to him; the law does not require me to be a good Samaritan.
But this result, Epstein (who approves of it) argues, is inconsistent with the
basic logic of the negligence system and shows that logic to be wrong. If the
cost to me of taking a measure that will avert an accident to another is lower
than the expected accident cost, the law should shift the accident cost from
the victim to me if I fail to take the measure, for this will give me an incentive to incur the lesser cost to avoid the greater, and thereby increase effi29 Richard A. Epstein, supra note 1, at 164-65, quoting Ronald H. Coase, The Problem
of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1, 2 (1962).
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ciency. No less an authority on utility maximizing than Jeremy Bentham
would agree with Epstein's point. 3°
Nor, says Epstein, can the economic optimizer limit liability to the case
where the cost to the rescuer is trivial. Even where there is a substantial risk
of bodily harm to the rescuer he should be liable for failure to rescue, so long
as the cost to the victim of not being rescued is greater than the expected
harm to him. From here it is but a step to situations in which judges might
conscript people for all sorts of activity upon a finding that the benefit of the
activity exceeded the cost to them.
But Epstein is incorrect that there is no logical stopping point under an
economic analysis in imposing liability on people in order to induce them to
perform socially productive activity. The rescue case is a plausible one for
liability because transaction costs are so high: when I see a flower pot about
to fall on someone's head I cannot pause to negotiate with him over an appropriate fee for warning him of the impending danger. There is no occasion
for compelling transactions where negotiations are feasible. Indeed, because
market transactions are preferable to legal transactions except where market
transaction costs are prohibitive, 3 ' a system of liability that coerced people
into performing services in circumstances where negotiations between them
and the beneficiaries of the services were possible would be economically
unsound.
Nor is the law's handling of the good Samaritan case quite so inconsistent
with the basic logic of economic analysis as Epstein implies. Affirmative
duties to avert harm to strangers are frequently imposed, the doctrines of
attractive nuisance and of last clear chance being examples. The principal
exception is the pure bystander case. Even here, the law will sometimes create
an incentive to help a stranger by recognizing a good Samaritan's legal right
to be compensated for the assistance rendered; indeed, Fletcher and Epstein's
favorite case, Vincent v: Lake Erie Transp. Co., 32 may be viewed as a case in
which a suit for such compensation was vindicated.33
30

Jeremy Bentham, Theory of Legislation 189-90 (R. Hildreth ed. 1864).

31 See Richard A. Posner, supra note 4, at 74-77. The point is further developed in
Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, chs. 6, 27 (forthcoming).
52

109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910).

33 The common law and especially Continental rules governing the legal rights and
liabilities of rescuers are discussed in John P. Dawson, Negotiorum Gestio: The Altruistic
Intermeddler, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1073 (1961). As he points out, the principal examples
in common law of the rescuer's being entitled to compensation from the rescued (in the
absence of any contractual or other preexisting relationship between the two) are maritime salvage and the right of physicians to recover fees from people whom they treat
under emergency conditions. See id. at 1096-98, 1119 and n.107; Cotnam v. Wisdom, 83
Ark. 601, 104 S.W. 164 (1907). Both liability for failure to rescue and the right to
compensation for rescuing are much greater in Continental jurisprudence. See, e.g., sec-
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But I am quite prepared to assume that the law is out of phase with economic analysis in the matter of warnings and rescues; it is hardly a point in
favor of Epstein's argument. His theory of strict liability is normative rather
than positive. His own proposal for dealing with the good Samaritan problem
is contrary, he admits, to the common law solution.
The final question that must be asked of Professor Epstein is how high a
price he is willing to pay to vindicate the interest in preventing judges from
imposing affirmative duties. It may be quite high. He hedges, as I have
remarked, on defenses, but there is a strong implication that no version of
contributory negligence will be permitted.34 Moreover, the logic of his argument would appear to compel him to tolerate-paradoxically in view of his
sensitivity to judicial overreaching-a substantial and potentially quite costly
expansion in the degree to which people's freedom of action may be limited by
common law liabilities. Suppose I make a completely innocent gesture, such as
removing my hand from my pocket, and a highly nervous bystander, mistaking
the purpose of the gesture, faints with fright. Under Epstein's theory of liability I may well be liable to the bystander because my gesture caused him to
faint.3 5 Now the fact that I am liable in such situations does not mean that I
will never take my hand out of my pocket. But I may hesitate before making
any gestures and the aggregate costs of such hesitations will be substantial. The
cheaper way of avoiding the accident would have been for the victim to obtain
treatment for his nervous ailment or to avoid situations in which an innocent
gesture would be likely to frighten him. But this efficient solution is not possible under Epstein's approach. He would say that the driver who without
fault injures a blind pedestrian is liable, while the present law would inquire
whether the pedestrian was carrying a blind man's stick (to alert drivers) and
otherwise taking inexpensive but effective measures to protect himself from

injury.
III
The analysis of the comparative economic properties of strict liability and
negligence, in part I of this paper, yielded conclusions that may be summarized as follows:
tion 330c of the German Penal Code, which makes it a crime to fail to render aid to
someone in danger, even at risk of bodily harm to the rescuer.
34 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, supra note 1, at 181, 197 and n.108.
3 Professor Epstein remarks that so vulnerable an individual would in all probability
not survive long enough to be done in by the defendant's gesture. But this is not a convincing point. He must be done in by someone or something, even if it is only a nurse
in the hospital where he is born, who would presumably be liable under Epstein's view.
Moreover, susceptibility to injury from fright might be the result of an illness or accident
at any age. I am also unpersuaded by his suggestion that there might be a defense, consistent with his general approach, in such a case. Id. at 172-73, n. 65. The general impression
that Epstein creates in the mind of this reader is that, while he wili not admit explicit
considerations of cost in his analysis, he is hopeful that his noneconomic approach will
not do serious economic damage.

HeinOnline -- 2 J. Legal Stud. 220 1973

STRICT LIABILITY

221

1. Economic theory provides no basis, in general, for preferring strict liability
to negligence, or negligence to strict liability, provided that some version of a contributory negligence defense is recognized. Empirical data might enable us to move
beyond agnosticism but we do not have any.
2. A strict liability standard without a contributory negligence defense is, in
principle, less efficient than the negligence-contributory negligence standard. Empirical data could of course rebut the presumption derived from theory.
The relevance of these findings to the articles discussed in part II is that
each author argues for strict liability without any version of a contributory
negligence defense. Each thus prefers a standard that, on the basis of existing
(and inadequate) knowledge, must be regarded as presumptively less efficient
than alternative standards. Since the efficient use of resources is an important
although not always paramount social value, the burden, I suggest, is on the
authors to present reasons why a standard that appears to impose avoidable
costs on society should nonetheless be adopted. They have not carried this
burden.
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